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WHAT COGNITIVE DISSONANCE TELLS
US ABOUT TONE IN PERSUASION
Kathryn Stanchi*
INTRODUCTION
One of the toughest questions that lawyers face is how hard to
push in persuasion. We want to advocate strongly enough so that
our passion for our client's cause, and our belief in its rightness, is
apparent to the court. There is nothing worse than lukewarm
advocacy. But we do not want to push so far that we cross from
zealous advocacy into obnoxiousness. The problem is that the line
between persuasion and coercion is a fine one.
This Article takes the first step in thinking about where good
advocacy should draw the line between zeal and coercion. Legal
advocates differ about how to navigate that line.' Is the best service
to the client to be found in the most aggressive, strongest, hard-line
approach? Or is a more tempered, reasonable approach most likely
to produce the best results?
This fundamental disagreement in advocacy philosophy is
certainly not limited to law. In the words of Richard Perloff, a
national expert in persuasion science:
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I would like to
thank Marilyn Walter and Betsy Fajans for putting together such a wonderful
symposium and inviting me to participate. Many thanks also to Linda Berger
and Emily Zimmerman, who provided insightful comments on prior drafts, and
Kevin Yoegel and Tam Tran, who provided excellent research assistance.
1 Compare Kathleen T. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility
Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 751 (1994), with
Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does Hardball Litigation Produce the Best
Result for Your Client?, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J., no. 1, Jan. 1993, at 24-28, 64. See also
Peter M. Appleton, Is Winning Everything?, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL., no. 6, Apr.
2002, at 21-23.
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Many ... view persuasion in John Wayne, macho
terms. Persuaders are seen as tough-talking sales
people, strongly stating their position, hitting people
over the head with arguments, and pushing the deal
to a close. But this oversimplifies matters. It
assumes that persuasion is a boxing match, won by
the fiercest competitor. In fact persuasion is
different. It's more like teaching than boxing. Think
of a persuader as a teacher, moving people step by
step to a solution, helping them appreciate why the
advocated position solves the problem best.2
On the other hand, well-known trial lawyer Gerry Spence has been
quoted as saying that he goes "to court to do battle, not dance the
minuet."3
This Article looks at cognitive science for guidance on this
question. One cognitive process that seems to be integral to tone is
cognitive dissonance, a concept I will explain in Part II. I then take
a close look at two types of advocacy strategies that exemplify the
conflict between the hardline and tempered approaches to
advocacy. The first advocacy strategy, addressed in Part III,
focuses on how to deal with arguments and information that
undermine your position. Is it best to sound like you believe your
case to be ideal and that contrary arguments are wholly without
merit or even spurious? Or is it best to acknowledge that there are
possible reasonable counterviews while still arguing that your
position has greater merit?
The second advocacy strategy, addressed in Part IV, is how to
approach a controversial rule or premise for which you are
advocating. Is the best approach to push early and hard in support
of the rule, or to ease the reader into the controversial point by
taking her through a step-by-step thought process that guides her to
the controversial point?
2 RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION
AND ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 12 (Jennings Bryant et al. eds., 4th ed.
2010).
Haig & Getman, supra note 1, at 26 (citing David Margolick, At the Bar:
Rambos Invade the Courtroom, and the Profession, Aghast, Fires Back with
Etiquette, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1988, at B5).
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The bottom line is that in both rhetorical situations, cognitive
dissonance supports an advocacy approach that, while still strong
in pursuit of a favorable outcome, appears more gradual, objective,
and reasonable. In other words, it is often advisable for lawyers to
present arguments in a way that appears to be reasonable,
measured, and objective.
Despite this conclusion, I do not take the position that a
reasonable, measured approach to advocacy is always the best
path. Nor do I suggest that lawyers should actually become
educators rather than zealous advocates. There are undoubtedly
occasions in which lawyers should push their positions
aggressively.4 Decisions about tone may change given the context
and the strengths of the merits of the case. The audience for the
argument is also, of course, a consideration-whether it is a judge,
a panel of judges, a court of last resort, or a jury.
My proposal is a modest one: lawyers should learn what
psychologists know about the typical reaction of human beings to
aggressive argumentation. This Article is meant to be a first step in
that endeavor and concludes that, in the circumstances described
below, the most persuasive approach-the one most
psychologically appealing to decision-makers-is one that appears
more balanced and reasonable rather than one that is aggressively
pushy and one-sided.
I. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable psychological state
that results when a person's strong beliefs (or "cognitions") clash.
4 For example, it is sometimes important for lawyers to advance an
argument that the judge has expressed displeasure with, or continue to object to
a line of questioning, or the like, because it is the right thing to do for the client.
At other times, it is appropriate to show outrage at a particular set of facts or a
particular legal decision. I do not mean to suggest a bright line rule about tone-
that lawyers must always make their arguments in a measured tone. I argue only
that, on balance, a reasonable tone often works better to persuade because of
how people react to aggressive argumentation.
5 See JOEL COOPER, COGNITIvE DISSONANCE: FiFTY YEARS OF A
CLASSICAL THEORY 2-6 (2007) (explaining that dissonance is aroused when
expectations are "discordant" with observations, which is an "uncomfortable,
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For example, when a person who considers herself a philanthropist
is asked for a donation and does not give, that is a scenario likely
to arouse cognitive dissonance, because the person's self-image (as
a philanthropist) is clashing with reality (her failure to give
money).6 Or, when a member of Mothers Against Drunk Driving
("MADD") finds herself tipsy and with no way home but to drive
her car. Cognitive dissonance can also arise when people's
expectations conflict with behavior or reality, such as when people
expected the year 2000 to cause a massive technological disaster
(the "Y2K problem"), but everything turned out to be fine.
The discomfort of cognitive dissonance arises because people
generally do not like inconsistency.8 When we are confronted with
conflicting thoughts, we become uncomfortable and will strive to
resolve that discomfort. 9 Dissonance also has a magnitude-the
unpleasant state" that causes anxiety and agitation). See also ARTHUR ARON &
ELAINE N. ARON, THE HEART OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A BACKSTAGE VIEW OF
A PASSIONATE SCIENCE 113-18 (2d ed. 1989); Elliot Aronson, Dissonance
Theory: Progress and Problems, in THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY 5, 5-
6 (Robert P. Abelson et al. eds., 1968).
6 For more examples of cognitive dissonance, see PERLOFF, supra note 2, at
236-38.
7 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 236; see also COOPER, supra note 5, at 2
(giving other examples). Many readers will likely remember that prior to the
year 2000, most computers represented the year using only the last two digits of
the year-for example, 95 for 1995. In the time leading up to the year 2000,
many predicted a massive computer failure because of the inability of computers
to distinguish the year 2000 from 1900. This was called the Y2K problem (an
acronym for "year 2000 problem"). Some thought that this failure would result
in a financial crisis as well as the failures of infrastructure and utilities. People
stockpiled food and water, avoided air travel, and withdrew their money from
banks. See Frances Romero, Y2K, TIME (May 20, 2011), http://content.time.com
/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2072678_2072683_2072599,00.html;
Press Release, Decision Analyst, Americans Planning to Take Y2K Precautions
(Nov. 19, 1999), available at http://decisionanalyst.com/publ-data/
1999/Y2K.dai. January 1, 2000, however, passed by with only minor glitches.
See Y2K Bug Fails to Bite, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilscience/nature/
585013.stm.
8 COOPER, supra note 5, at 2.
9 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 238-40 (describing cognitive dissonance as
an "amalgamation of physiological arousal, negative affect, and mental
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stronger the clash of beliefs, the more acute the feeling of
dissonance.10
There are a number of ways that people resolve dissonance. In
the hypothetical about the woman in MADD, the woman could
change her behavior (resolve herself to sleeping in the car), change
her belief (driving tipsy isn't that bad), or rationalize (just this
once ... otherwise I'll freeze out here)." Cognitive dissonance
creates the potential to change not only behavior, but also beliefs. 12
The reality is, however, that when confronted with cognitive
dissonance, most people do not chanpe their strongly held beliefs.
Instead, most people rationalize. Even more interesting,
sometimes when people are confronted with a situation or reality
that clashes with their belief, their minds will alter that situation or
reality to the extent possible to move it toward consistency with
the belief.14 For example, those who firmly believed that the year
2000 would cause a computer disaster might not have reacted to
the reality of the uneventful passing of January 1, 2000 by
sheepishly acknowledging that they overreacted. Rather, they
might "alter reality" by insisting that the disaster had actually
happened on January 1 but that the real consequences would be
experienced in the years to come.Is
Cognitive dissonance is aroused in many advocacy situations,
and that means that advocates can take advantage of knowledge
about cognitive dissonance in a number of ways. There are
situations in which it is advantageous to the advocate to arouse
cognitive dissonance. In other situations, the best path is advocacy
that helps to avoid or alleviate a decision-maker's dissonance. In
anguish").
'o Id. at 239.
1 For a list of possible ways to overcome dissonance, see id. at 240.
12 Id. at 239.
" Id. at 241, 250 ("[H]uman beings are not rational animals, but, rather,
rationalizing animals.") (emphasis added) (quoting Aronson, supra note 5, at 6).
14 People will "deny and distort reality, refusing to acknowledge they made
a mistake." Id. at 241.
" See id at 236. Or, the believers in the Y2K disaster may also assert that
no problems occurred because a small number of people were vigilant and
solved the problems before they happened.
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any event, it is critical for advocates to have a feel for: 1) which
advocacy situations arouse dissonance; 2) whether the resolution of
that dissonance is potentially advantageous; and 3) how to avoid
dissonance, if it would be more advantageous to do so. Those
questions are addressed in the following sections.
II. VOLUNTEERING BAD INFORMATION: SHOWING YOUR WARTS
If you look at the briefs being filed in courts, you will see
widely different rhetorical approaches to dealing with adverse
information and counter-arguments. Some briefs are aggressive
and hard line in arguing their position. These kinds of briefs
eschew any shows of weakness, and, if weaknesses appear in them,
the weaknesses are quickly and decisively batted away as
irrelevant or without merit.16 These briefs would never be called
"educational" or "informational." They have a clear point of view
that is unwavering.' 7 One judge described these kinds of briefs as
"screaming" and "table pounding."' 8 Clients often like this style of
16 See Richard Gabriel, Professionalism in Today's Competitive Legal
Market, 39 COLO. LAW, no. 6, June 2010, at 65, 66 (noting that repeated use of
words "frivolous" "groundless," and "wholly without merit" are not persuasive).
See generally Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United
States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U.
HAW. L. REv. 1 (2000) (describing various disrespectful rhetorical techniques,
including arguments put forth as though there is no reasonable counter-point).
17 It is worth noting here that sometimes the aggressive approach is a
deliberate rhetorical strategy. Other times, though, lawyers fall into a common
trap of becoming so involved with the client and the client's case that they quite
literally cannot see weaknesses in their own cases. As a result, they write briefs
in the aggressive style. One commentator refers to this inability to see beyond
the strengths of the case as "myopic vision." Kristin K. Robbins, Paradigm
Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L.
REv. 483, 516-22 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost]. This trap is
quite common for legal advocates, in particular for those who represent a certain
category of client over and over. See Jay M. Quam, Keys to Effective Advocacy:
What I Wish I'd Known as a Litigator, 65 BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2008)
(describing lawyers whose judgment about weak cases get clouded because they
want to give the client what he wants).
1 Gabriel, supra note 16, at 66-67. This style of advocacy is also
sometimes called "Rambo" advocacy (as in just shoot everyone and everything)
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advocacy because it looks like they have someone truly on their
side.19
Then there are briefs that adopt a more moderate tone. It is
clear that these advocates still have an agenda and want to win, but
the rhetoric is cloaked in an aura of objectivity. 20 These briefs
appear as though the advocate has thoughtfully considered both
sides and has, upon deliberation, landed on the side favorable to
the client. It is, of course, highly unlikely to have been the lawyer's
actual process of advocacy to weigh both sides objectively (at least
once the lawyer determined that representation of the client was a
good idea). Rather, it is a purposeful strategy that makes the
argument more closely mimic the judge's process of decision-
making.
So what does the science tell us, if anything, about resolving
this fundamental philosophical disagreement? At least part of the
answer lies in cognitive dissonance. Many studies of persuasive
messages, both within and outside the legal context, demonstrate
that voluntarily disclosing harmful information makes a message
more persuasive, as long as that harmful information is rebutted
effectively by the advocate.21 In other words, you are better off
acknowledging your flaws than ignoring them, and you should
address why your message should be accepted despite those flaws.
But in rebutting whatever counterarguments exist, the advocate
should give the appearance of having honestly and objectively
considered the other arguments. Glib rebuttals, or those that
"scorch the earth," should be avoided.22
or "scorched earth" (as in drop the bomb and consequences be damned). Browe,
supra note 1, at 755.
19 Browe, supra note 1, at 774-75, 778-79 (clients may want Rambo style
advocacy).
20 These briefs often have numerous demonstrations of lawyer ethos-a
label Aristotle put on an advocate's reputation for intelligence, truthfulness, and
other positive character traits. See MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL
WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES FOR PERSUASIVE WRITING 127 (3d ed.
2012) (defining ethos).
21 See generally Kathryn Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 381
(2008) [hereinafter Stanchi, Playing with Fire] and studies cited therein.
22 Of course, whether to reveal a flaw in a persuasive argument depends on
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How does cognitive dissonance shed light on this question?
The uncomfortable psychological state of cognitive dissonance
arises both from advocacy that is too positive and acknowledges no
flaws, as well as from advocacy that voluntarily discloses flaws.
The details of how dissonance operates in both those scenarios are
outlined in Section A. The key, though, is how the decision-maker
resolves the dissonance. As the following sections indicate, the
way decision-makers are likely to resolve dissonance cuts against
one-sided advocacy and toward more reasonable acknowledgement
of harmful information and counterarguments.
A. Messages That "Protest Too Much"
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.23
In Shakespeare's Hamlet, the quote above is spoken by
Hamlet's mother, Queen Gertrude, during a scene in Hamlet's play
in which the Player Queen vows her eternal love to her husband,
the king, and swears never to remarry. Gertrude's response
indicates her opinion that the Player Queen's vows are not worthy
of belief because she has voiced them so insistently and without
qualification.
"Protesting too much" in legal advocacy can take many forms.
One common form is the "too-perfect" argument that contains only
positive information and does not acknowledge the existence of
flaws. For example, a description of a client that makes the client
appear to be "too good to be true" protests too much.24 Arguments
that offer only supportive information and ignore any opposing
the interaction of a number of complex factors-among them how serious is the
flaw, how likely is it to be raised by the other side, and is there a way to mitigate
or address it. The advocate should consider all those factors. But on balance, if it
is a close call or other factors are equal, the science militates in favor of
disclosure and refutation. Id.
23 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 2.
24 As Ruth Anne Robbins notes, the statement of facts should be written
with the client as the hero, and heroes always have flaws. See Ruth Anne
Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 775-76 (2006).
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arguments, so called "one-sided messages," suffer from a similar
problem.
Another common argument that "protests too much" is one that
addresses flaws or opposing arguments but does so in a flippant
way, or a relentlessly aggressive way. This kind of argument
nominally raises flaws, but often the flaws are "straw men" raised
only so that they can be knocked down. 25
Although it can look like it is considering both sides, this kind
of argument is actually one-sided. It does not have the appearance
of having objectively considered reasonable opposing views;
instead, all opposing views, even reasonable ones, are wholly
rejected as ridiculous or without merit.
One-sided messages like these protest too much. As a result,
they can backfire by leading decision-makers to embrace the
opposite of what the message advocates. The backfire results in
part from the arousal of the message recipient's cognitive
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is aroused by messages that
"protest too much" because these messages will conflict with two
strongly held beliefs: (1) no person or argument is perfect, and (2)
all arguments have two sides.26 These strongly held and
widespread beliefs spring from a common natural skepticism that
things that appear "too good to be true, 27 are not. The feelings of
25 T. EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO FALLACY FREE ARGUMENTS 221 (7th ed. 2012). Damer describes a
"straw man" argument as a weaker "caricature of an opponent's argument that
the faulty arguer substitutes" for the actual argument, for the sole purpose of
knocking it down. The "straw man" is a fallacy because it does not rebut the
actual opposing argument. Id. Although it is a fallacy, the "straw man" can be
effective, because it distorts the opponent's argument (making it seem less
effective).
26 Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 397.
27 See Joseph R. Priester et al., Whence Univalent Ambivalence? From the
Anticipation of Conflicting Reactions, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 12, 19-20
(2007) ("[M]any people recognize that there are two sides to every story and
that nothing is perfect (or completely worthless)."). See also Michael Burgoon et
al., Revisiting the Theory of Psychological Reactance, in THE PERSUASION
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 213, 215-18 (Price
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (describing research that showed the
audience may interpret a persuasive message that is too strong as a threat to
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dissonance aroused by the conflict between the message that
"protests too much" and these strongly held beliefs can make the
message recipient view the message as biased and overly pushy.
Concluding that there is something wrong with the message
resolves the dissonance and allows the reader to cling to her
strongly held beliefs.28 Once a message recipient's cognitive
dissonance leads her to believe that the message is flawed (by bias
or coercive tactics), the message recipient is likely to reject the
message. 29
Because of these strongly held beliefs, when people hear a
client described in an unrealistically positive way, or hear an
argument that seems improbably airtight, they assume there must
be something wrong.30 That feeling that "something is wrong" is
freedom of choice and resist that message); Taeda Jovicic, The Effectiveness of
Argument Strategies, 20 ARGUMENTATION 29, 47 (2006) (arguing that
persuasive messages that are too strong "may stimulate a negative evaluation of
the message, searching for information to confirm alternatives, and
aggressiveness toward the persuader").
28 See Russell A. Jones & Jack W. Brehm, Persuasiveness of One- and
Two-Sided Communications as a Function ofAwareness There Are Two Sides, 6
J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 47, 55 (1970) (concluding that reduced
effectiveness of one-sided communications is attributed to audience perception
that such messages are biased and are exerting pressure).
29 An excellent example of this phenomenon appears in Bennett v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., No. 13-3047, 2013 WL 5312398 (6th
Cir. Sept. 24, 2013). In this case, defendant State Farm had derided one of
plaintiffs arguments as "ridiculous." The court had this to say: "There are good
reasons not to call an opponent's argument "ridiculous," which is what State
Farm calls Barbara Bennett's principal argument here. The reasons include
civility; the near-certainty that overstatement will only push the reader away
(especially when, as here, the hyperbole begins on page one of the brief); and
that, even where the record supports an extreme modifier, "the better practice is
usually to lay out the facts and let the court reach its own conclusions." But here
the biggest reason is more simple: the argument that State Farm derides as
ridiculous is instead correct." Id. at *1. Interestingly, at least one experienced
insurance lawyer who read this believed that State Farm's argument had
substantive merit, which means that a good argument was rejected in this case
because of overly aggressive tone. See E-mail from Elizabeth Shaver to author
(October 23, 2013) (on file with author).
30 See Jerold L. Hale et al., Cognitive Processing of One- and Two-Sided
Persuasive Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH CoMM. 380, 387 (1991); Priester et al.,
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cognitive dissonance. In messages that protest too much, the belief
that nothing is perfect clashes with the reality of a persuasive
message that seems to be perfect. The magnitude of dissonance felt
will increase with the one-sidedness of the message-the more
biased the message, and the more aggressively it is pushed, the
more dissonance a decision-maker will feel.
When confronted with a clash between a strong belief that
there are two sides to every story and the reality of a one-sided
story, there are a few likely results, which are discussed below.
None of these likely results favor the advocate who advances the
"too-perfect" argument.31 People will go to great lengths to avoid
changing or discarding strongly held beliefs. Rather, like the
people who continued to insist after January 1, 2000 that the year
2000 would bring disaster, most people will "change" reality to fit
their strongly held beliefs.
1. The "Too-perfect" Message Arouses Dissonance That
Encourages the Audience to Look for Flaws
One response people can have to the dissonance created by a
"too-perfect" message is to look closely for flaws. For many
people, finding a flaw will ease the dissonance. Thus, if an
advocate presents his client as perfect, the reader may wonder
whether there is information missing and may search for failings or
weaknesses. 32 In the same way, if an advocate presents only
supra note 27, at 19-20 (noting when confronted by a message that puts forth
only "pros" or "cons," people will feel conflicted and ambivalent).
31 The only option that does favor the advocate of a "too-perfect"
message-changing or modifying the belief that no person or argument is
perfect-is unlikely. See COOPER, supra note 5, at 4-5. In general, it is difficult
to change a strongly held belief. Id. at 8. In his book, Cooper tells a story of a
religious group that had predicted and anticipated the end of the world on a
particular date. When the world did not end at the appointed time, the magnitude
of the cognitive dissonance of the religious followers was enormous. But, in the
end, they did not resolve that dissonance by concluding that they were simply
wrong. Instead, they believed that their faith had stopped the end of the world.
Id. at 4-5.
32 See Priester et al., supra note 27, at 19-20 (the absence of contrary
information makes people concerned that contrary information exists). See also
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positive arguments, the reader will scrutinize the arguments for
holes in a way that she would not if the message were more
balanced. 3 In the legal context, while the reader searching for
flaws might not find any in the one-sided argument, she is likely to
find them elsewhere: the other side's arguments, or by independent
research (for example, by a judicial clerk). So, the advocate
advancing a "too-perfect" argument has already created problems
for himself because he has aroused people's natural skepticism and
motivated them to find evidence to support their skepticism.34
But things may get even worse once the evidence of a flaw is
found-and it almost always will be, because, of course, most
things are not perfect. Once a reader finds the flaw he has been
seeking, he may feel a surge of relief and satisfaction at the release
of the dissonance and the confirmation of the strongly held belief
that things are not perfect.35 In most scenarios, where things are
not presented as "perfect," people expect flaws and may react to a
flaw with indifference or mild interest. But to someone seeking a
flaw in a "too-perfect" argument, finding that flaw is validating
and satisfying. It creates the feeling of "Aha! I knew it!"3 6 The
Jovicic, supra note 27, at 47 (noting that persuasive messages can stimulate a
message recipient to search for alternatives to the message); Derek D. Rucker et
al., What's in a Frame Anyway?: A Meta-Cognitive Analysis of the Impact of
One Versus Two Sided Message Framing on Attitude Certainty, 18 J.
CONSUMER. PSYCHOL. 137, 138 (2008) ("[W]hen a message presents only one-
sided attributes (positive or negative), people sometimes assume that there are
opposite attributes of which they are unaware . . . . [W]hen a source indicates
that negatives have been considered, concern over possible missing information
can be put aside . . . .").
3 See sources cited supra note 27. See generally JAMES B. STIFF & PAUL A.
MONGEAU, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 142-43 (2d ed. 2003) ("[M]essage
sources gain a persuasive advantage by making their arguments as complete as
is possible.").
34 See Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 404 (noting the natural
skepticism in response to one-sided messages).
3 See Jovicic, supra note 27, at 46-47. Psychologists refer to this as
"restoration" because the feelings of conflict and dissonance are resolved and a
satisfying stasis is restored. Id. at 46. Restoration makes people feel good about
the "attractiveness of alternatives to the persuasive message." Id. at 47.
36 Think about how common it is for many people to feel satisfaction when
they hear that some fabulous celebrity got divorced or was arrested. That feeling
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feeling of having cognitive dissonance resolved by confirmation of
a strongly held belief makes a reader who feels this sense of
achievement unlikely to casually dismiss the flaw or overlook it.
Instead, she is going to feel a keen interest in it.3 7
Another outcome, equally unfavorable to the advocate pressing
the "too-perfect" message, is that the reader will attempt to resolve
the cognitive dissonance by assuming that the argument, or client,
has flaws but that, for some reason, the advocate has not disclosed
them. The reader may then conclude that the advocate is not aware
of the flaws because he is not fully informed about the issues or the
case. Once the reader concludes that the advocate is not
knowledgeable, he is likely to reject the advocate's other
arguments as the product of incomplete information or knowledge.
This is called the "discounting hypothesis" because the audience
discounts the advocate's message based on its assessment of the
credibility of the advocate herself.38
On the other hand, the recipient of the "too-perfect" persuasive
message may conclude that the absence of flaws in the argument
means that the advocate is deliberately withholding information
is similar to what happens when a flaw is revealed to someone who is
experiencing the cognitive dissonance of a "too-perfect" persuasive message.
37 Confirmation bias is also certainly at work in this cognitive process.
Confirmation bias makes people favor information that confirms their beliefs
and hypotheses. See Margit Oswold & Stephan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in
COGNITIvE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING
79, 79 (Rudiger F. Pohl ed., 2012). Among other effects of confirmation bias is
the tendency to selectively notice or remember certain evidence or interpret
ambiguous evidence in a biased way. Id.; see also Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric
J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Beliefs and
Values, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 120, 133 (2002).
3 See Mike Allen, Meta-Analysis Comparing the Persuasiveness of One-
Sided and Two-Sided Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 390, 392, 398 (1991)
(finding support for discounting hypothesis in study of two sided messages).
Because people assume that most arguments have two sides-that there is no
perfect argument-they may conclude that the source of a one-sided message
simply does not know enough about the topic to know all of the pros and cons.
See also SMITH, supra note 20, at 149 (noting that the more an advocate can
establish herself as a capable and intelligent source of information, the more the
audience will give her arguments credibility).
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from her. That will lead her to conclude that the advocate is not
credible or honest. 39 And once a subject has decided not to trust the
advocate, she will be less likely to accept a message from that
source. That response to dissonance is called "reactance" and it can
cause a subject to reject an entire message.40 It is a kind of "baby
out with the bathwater" reaction, because the whole message can
suffer once reactance has been aroused. 4 1 Reactance will be
explored more deeply in the next section.
2. The Cognitive Dissonance Aroused by the "Too-perfect"
Message Can Lead the Audience to Reject the Message
Legal persuasion can be seen, in many ways, as a social
situation between the advocate and the decision-maker. The
advocate and decision-maker have tacitly agreed to engage in a
process in which the advocate can try to convince the decision-
maker of some fact or theory, and the decision-maker will listen
and be receptive to the arguments and render an unbiased
decision.42 This agreement between advocate and decision-maker,
3 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40 See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL
REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 1-4 (1981) (finding that an
attempt to persuade can be a threat to decision-making freedom). See also Jones
& Brehm, supra note 28, at 55 (noting that overt, strong persuasion can be
perceived as exerting pressure).
41 Jones & Brehm, supra note 28, at 49. This study noted that a message
that pressures a person to adopt a particular position threatens that person's
decisional freedom, and the person will try to restore the threatened freedom by
rejecting the message. Id. Messages that address only positive or supporting
arguments are more likely to lead to reactance, because they represent a greater
threat to decisional freedom. Id. at 49, 55. See also Jovicic, supra note 27, at 47
("[Reactance] stimulate[s] negative evaluation of the message, searching for
information to confirm the alternatives, and aggressiveness toward the
persuader.").
42 See generally FRANS VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996). See also Jovicic, supra note 27, at 31.
Jovicic summarizes a group of argumentation theorists, including the
Amsterdam school, the formal dialectics, the Woods-Walton and the Walton
approach as all agreeing that argument is a social, dialogic activity. Id. at 31-32;
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like most social situations, has unwritten social norms. One of
those social norms is that the advocate will not try to persuade by
deception. If a decision-maker resolves cognitive dissonance by
concluding that the advocate has purposefully withheld
information, the decision-maker may feel that the advocate has
violated the norms of the persuasive social situation.43 When a
decision-maker resolves cognitive dissonance by concluding that
the advocate has purposefully withheld information, the advocate's
"too-perfect" message can lead to what is called "reactance."
Reactance (sometimes called a "boomerang" reaction) is a
backlash against a persuasive message in which decision-makers
reject the entire message, not because of the merits of that
message, but because they oppose the feeling of being controlled."
When a persuasive message is "too-perfect" or when it pushes too
hard in its tone, as when the rebuttal of opposing arguments is too
strident or contentious, the decision-maker may feel manipulated
or controlled. And the feeling of being manipulated can arouse all
kinds of negative feelings, including anger and betrayal. Decision-
makers may feel like the advocate has threatened their decision-
making autonomy.45 The line between persuasion and coercion has
see also DOUGLAS WALTON, ONE SIDED ARGUMENTS: A DIALECTICAL
ANALYSIS OF BIAS 29-32 (1999) (persuasion as a dialogue with a collective
goal).
43 See FRANS VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS OF
REASONABLENESS: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH CONCERNING THE PRAGMA-
DIALECTIC DISCUSSION RULES 203-20 (2009) [hereinafter EEMEREN ET AL.,
FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS] (discussing how fallacies are "violations of the
rules of critical discussions"); see also Jovicic, supra note 27, 32-33 (describing
strategic maneuvering in which parties to an argument agree on "norms, rules
and stages of argument").
4 Id.; Burgoon et al., supra note 27, at 214. See also EEMEREN ET AL.,
FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 43, at 144-45 (describing how
censoring or redacting arguments results in movement of belief toward the
censored argument); Mark V. A. Howard et al., How Processing Resources
Shape the Influence of Stealing Thunder on Mock-Juror Verdicts, 13
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 60, 65 (2006).
45 See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 40, at 1-2, 20-21, 25; Jones & Brehm,
supra note 28, at 48, 55. Reactance theory "assumes that individuals believe
they have specific behavioral freedoms and proposes that if a freedom is
threatened, the motive to reassert the freedom will be aroused." Id. at 25. When
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been crossed and the social norm broken. Reactance is a typical
response to these kinds of feelings. And, it is not a good response
for the advocate. Reactance means the decision-maker is
emotionally motivated to reject the message and is likely to do
S.46so.4
Even if the decision-maker does not feel that the "too-perfect"
message was intentionally deceptive, she may still feel that the
advocate is trying to bias her decision. In this scenario, even if she
isn't angry, the decision-maker will no longer feel the need to
abide by the norms of the persuasive situation because the
advocate has already broken them. Recall that in the social
situation of persuasion, the decision-maker's "agreement" is to
listen, be receptive, and render an objective judgment on the
merits. If the decision-maker concludes that an advocate has
withheld information, the decision-maker may (subconsciously)
feel released from these obligations. A decision-maker who is
psychologically freed from the obligation to listen and assess the
merits of an argument is one who can more easily reject a
persuasive message.
Thus, a "too-perfect" or too-strident message, whether the
decision-maker concludes it is intentionally deceptive or just an
advocate's idealization of the case, can lead to reactance and to a
rejection of the advocate's message, regardless of the merits.
Professor Jim Stratman provides an example of reactance in his
think aloud study of clerks who read an appellant's brief that was a
strident attack on the judicial opinion from which it was
appealing. 47 In this study, Professor Stratman had the appellant's
decisional or behavioral freedom is threatened, the person is likely to oppose the
threat, even sometimes if that means acting against self-interest, or acting
against other strongly held beliefs. Id. at 1 (telling the story of a shop owner
who, though sympathetic to the message of civil rights demonstrators, closed his
shop rather than give in to their demands).
46 Once a decision-maker is motivated to reject the message, she will likely
look for reasons to support her judgment against the message of the offending
advocate. See generally Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational
Tail, 108 PSYCH. REv. 814 (2001) (people make decisions by intuition and
emotion, and then use logic to generate reasons for the emotional decision). The
Bennett v. State Farm case referenced supra note 29 is an example of reactance.
47 James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal
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attorney record his thoughts while drafting a brief, and had the
judge's clerks record their thoughts while reading that brief.48 In
one of his recordings, the appellant's attorney describes his
strategy to attack virtually every aspect of the adverse decision
below. His brief does seem to address counterarguments, but does
so in a way that is simultaneously superficial, aggressive, and
somewhat contemptuous. The advocate has fallen into one of the
kinds of "too protesting" arguments. This is an excerpt from the
appellant lawyer's recorded thoughts:
I think I will make, yes, the attack on the lower
court opinion,
[I] can attack its failure to deal with Philadelphia
Eagles and Barsky,
I can attack its reliance on Meta v. Yellow Cab [all
cases cited by the lower court],
I can attack its reliance on the right to jury trial
cases,
I can attack its failure to address Conestoga Bank,
and I can attack . . . .49
While, of course, it is an appellant's job to find fault with the
opinion below, the advocate here may have become too caught up
in "attacking" and framed his argument using rhetoric that was too
"uncompromising."50 First, the tone of the brief was harshly
negative about the opinion below.5 1 And, second, the advocate
attacked almost every aspect of the court's decision, from the
smallest point to the largest, and did so with an unwavering
stridency. 52 This is a common advocacy problem, in which the
lawyer, overcome with zeal for his client's cause (or anger at
opposing counsel), cannot separate trivial (or even imagined)
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal
Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 44, 46-47 (1994).
48 Id. at 18-23.
49 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 Id. (noting that the advocate's zeal might have pushed his rhetoric from
"righteous indignation" to "ridicule").
52 Id. at 35-36. As Professor Stratman puts it, the advocate's zeal leads him
to "attack shadows as well as substance." Id.
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wrongs from serious ones.
The clerks in Professor Stratman's study had a classic
reactance response to the "protesting" quality of appellant's brief.
The strength of the appellant's attack interrupted the flow of their
reading and evaluation of the merits and the clerks bristled at the
tone. Instead of focusing on the substance of the arguments, the
clerks instead focused on the lawyer and his tactics. Ultimately the
rhetoric made them recoil and they rejected the argument.
For example, when one clerk reads the portion of the
appellant's brief that hammered away at a small, and relatively
inconsequential, point in the court's opinion below, the clerk notes:
I didn't see [the court] assuming that-
That's not really being fair to the Commonwealth
Court-
I didn't read that the Commonwealth Court opinion
even suggests that. . .
This is the typical mode of argument where you set
up a straw man and then knock it down. 54
The "straw man" comment, in particular, shows that the clerk
felt that the advocate was trying to mislead or dupe her, and she
reacts with the anger typical of a reactance response.5 5 Ultimately,
this response does not serve the appellant well, as the clerks reject
his argument largely on the basis of tone as opposed to substantive
5 See Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note 17, at 516-23. This is an
example of "myopic vision" noted above. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text. The advocate's zeal has effectively blinded her to any strength or merit in
the other side's argument. An example of this is when lawyers bring up some
unprofessional behavior of opposing counsel, or trivial discovery disputes, in
merits briefs. This is more common than it should be and likely to get a stinging
response from a judge. See Judith D. Fischer, Incivility in Lawyers' Writing:
Judicial Handling ofRambo Run Amok, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 372-74 (2011)
(providing examples of discipline for incivility to opposing counsel); Fajans &
Falk, supra note 16, at 43-44 (criticizing a litigant's "peevish ad hominem
attacks" against an opposing party). See also Robert Sayler, Rambo Litigation:
Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, 74 A.B.A. J., no. 3, Mar. 1998, at 79, 81
(likening hardball litigators to General Custer, who famously fired off "in every
direction").
54 Stratman, supra note 47, at 39.




In addition to reactance, people can have another common
response to a violation of the social norms of persuasion. If a
decision-maker feels that the persuasive message is biased, or that
their decision-making autonomy has been otherwise corrupted or
manipulated, she might "over-correct."
Over-correction occurs when a decision-maker feels that an
advocate or another factor has caused her decision-making process
to become biased.5 7 As with reactance, the decision-maker has
become distracted from the merits of the argument and has been
made acutely conscious of the persuasive situation. Like the clerks
in Stratman's study, the decision-maker is now not thinking about
the merits of the case but instead about the manipulation of the
persuasive context. When this happens, the advocate has lost the
attention and good will of the decision-maker.
But while reactance can cause decision-makers to reject the
message outright, over-correction is often a little more subtle. With
over-correction, the decision-maker has identified some factor or
piece of evidence that she feels has unfairly influenced her
decision-making process. She may then try to "put her finger on
the scale" and correct for the perceived bias.
The problem is that people are rarely accurate in their
assessment of what an "unbiased" decision would be. 59
Commonly, people "over-correct" for bias, meaning they swing the
pendulum far away from the decision they perceive as unfairly
biased. Therefore, in trying to make a balanced decision, they end
up making a decision counter to the message of the advocate who
56 See id. at 44-46.
5 See Richard E. Petty et al., Flexible Correction Processes in Social
Judgment: Implication for Persuasion, 16 Soc. COGNITION 93, 96-97 (1998).
5 See Durairaj Maheswaran & Shelly Chaiken, Promoting Systematic
Processing in Low Motivation Settings: Effect of Incongruent Information on
Processing and Judgment, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 24 (1991).
5 Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model:
The Role of NaYve Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141, 143 (1997). Psychologists note that,
on balance, people are pretty incompetent to correct for perceived bias and use
"naIve theories" of bias to judge bias in persuasive messages. Id. at 143, 149-51.
111
JOURNAL OF LA WAND POLICY
has introduced the biasing factor.60 The important psychological
point is that over-correction does not lead to unbiased decisions; it
leads decision-makers to feel as though they have made unbiased
decisions (relieving their cognitive dissonance). So, if an
advocate's tone or rhetoric makes a decision-maker feel that she is
being unfairly influenced or biased, the advocate may have
actually moved the decision-maker toward a decision for the other
side. And the greater the perceived bias, the more vigilant the
decision-maker will be in her pursuit of correction.61
In one study in the trial context, for example, psychologists
tested whether mock jurors would over-correct if key witness
testimony was discredited.62 The study involved a simple dog bite
case in which plaintiff suffered a bite from a German Shepherd.
The main issue for jurors was whether the dog belonged to
defendant. 6 3 In the control version, mock jurors heard testimony
both for and against each party; the case was designed to be
close.64 In one experimental version, jurors heard an additional
pro-plaintiff eyewitness who testified that the dog belonged to the
defendant. 6 5 The experimental eyewitness testimony was designed
to clearly sway the case in the plaintiffs favor. The pro-plaintiff
eyewitness testified vehemently in favor of the plaintiff and
phrased her testimony in an accusatory manner.66 The catch was
that the pro-plaintiff eyewitness was later seriously discredited on
6o See id. at 143, 146, 151-52. Although sometimes attempts at correction
can result in a decision in favor of the persuasive message, this is unlikely if
reactance has been aroused. The more likely decision is one that rejects the
message. Id. See generally MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND
RESEARCH (Jennings Bryant & Mary Beth Oliver eds., 3d ed. 2009) (reactance
motivates counter-arguing and leads to a judgment against the message that
stimulates the reactance).
61 See Wegener & Petty, supra note 59, at 149.
62 Nina Hatvany & Fritz Strack, The Impact of a Discredited Key Witness,
10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 494 (1980).
63 Id
SId.
65 Id. at 494-95. There is another experimental version where the




cross-examination, and she recanted her testimony.67 Jurors were
then told to disregard her testimony.
The study shows that the testimony of the accusatory pro-
plaintiff witness, who is later discredited, pushed jurors to more
often find for the defendant. Mock jurors who heard the discredited
and accusatory pro-plaintiff eyewitness found for the defendant in
significantly greater numbers than the control jurors.68 By
testifying confidently and accusingly for the plaintiff and then
being discredited, the pro-plaintiff witness made it more likely that
defendant would win.6 9 The mock jurors believed that they had
been biased by the false eyewitness testimony, and they over-
corrected by finding for the defendant. 70
This study illustrates that when decision-makers feel as though
they have been biased by an argument, or their objectivity has been
compromised, whether it is strident testimony or an argument that
"protests too much," the decision-maker may react by fighting
against the argument and over-correcting against the perceived
bias.7 1 The result is a decision against the strident or protesting
advocate.
B. The Lesson About Acknowledging Flaws: There is Real
Power in Showing Vulnerability
Pushing your perspective too stridently in a persuasive
situation leads to cognitive dissonance, and that dissonance can
lead a decision-maker to reject the message out of hand. But
cognitive dissonance causes another wrinkle in the question of
whether to disclose flaws. Studies have shown that, paradoxically,
an advocate who does acknowledge counter-arguments, or who
67 Id. at 494-95.
68 Id. at 501.
69 id.
'0 Id. at 504.
71 Of course, there are other possible reactions. Over-correction to bias can
be tricky because a person can overthink and ping back and forth between
biasing one side or the other. What the science, shows, however, is that the
advocate who pushes too hard runs a real and significant risk that his argument
will actually push the audience away from his message.
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volunteers information that seems to damage her case, is also
likely to arouse cognitive dissonance in the decision-maker. As in
the "too-perfect" message, the cognitive dissonance reaction here
has to do with the decision-maker's expectations. For example,
most people do not expect a first date to voluntarily blurt out faults
("Actually, I don't have a source of income-can you get the
check?"); rather, we expect a person on a first date to put his very
best foot forward. If a flaw is disclosed on a first date, people are
surprised and may experience cognitive dissonance.
Advocacy situations can work similarly. In situations in which
people expect advocacy, such as trials or other legal advocacy
situations (and first dates), people may not expect an advocate to
voluntarily raise flaws, even if they believe that all arguments have
two sides. 72 Therefore, if an advocate freely discloses bad
information, that may arouse dissonance. The clash in this scenario
is between the expectation that advocates are only supposed to
offer information beneficial to their side, and the reality that an
advocate is openly admitting harmful information.
It may seem here that persuasion scientists have contradicted
themselves. Do people expect experts to raise both sides of an
argument, or do they expect experts to present only a rosy picture?
The answer is we don't really know: it depends on context. Recall
how Dr. Perloff described persuasion as more like teaching than
boxing. 73 That may be true, but advocacy is really a spectrum.
Sometimes people can tolerate or even expect pushier advocacy-
think about car salesmen, or pitchpersons trying to sell things on
infomercials. Most people do not expect car salesmen or hawkers
on infomercials to detail the flaws of a car or product. In other
situations, though, people expect advocates to be more like
teachers-objective and educational, similar to experts on a talk or
news show, or expert witnesses. If we think of persuasion
scenarios on a spectrum between teaching and boxing, then where
the advocate and scenario fall on the spectrum influences the
72 Kipling D. Williams & Lara Dolnik, Revealing the Worst First: Stealing
Thunder as a Social Influence Strategy, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: DIRECT AND
INDIRECT INFLUENCES 213, 216 (Joseph P. Forgas & Kipling D. Williams eds.,
2001).
7 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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audience's expectations.7 4 And our expectations are the key to
cognitive dissonance. Not surprisingly, studies show that people
have far different expectations of advocates who are advertisers or
salespeople than they do of advocates who are experts trying to
educate us. 75 Both advocates are trying to persuade us of
something, but we expect different behavior from them.
Where on the spectrum do legal advocates fit? Are we more
like car salesmen or more like experts interviewed on a news
program? It is not easy to say, but we are a little of both. While
some judges, for example, may have a strong expectation (or
desire) that advocates disclose both sides, 76 lay juries may expect
us to be one-sided "hired guns." For my purposes here, the
important point is that regardless of how people view legal
advocates, cognitive dissonance works in favor of the advocate
who discloses flaws. I have already discussed why cognitive
dissonance favors disclosure of flaws if the decision-maker expects
to hear both sides. But, it also favors disclosure of flaws if the
decision-maker does not expect a lawyer to disclose.
As noted above, when human beings experience dissonance,
they are highly driven to resolve it. 77 Reactance and over-
correction are just two possible reactions. Our brains will do
whatever is needed to alleviate this uncomfortable psychological
state. When a person experiences dissonance because of the
incongruity of hearing a flaw in the advocate's own position from
an advocacy source that he expects to be biased, the person can
74 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 13-14.
7 See Daniel O'Keefe, How to Handle Opposing Arguments in Persuasive
Messages: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of One-Sided and Two-Sided
Messages, 22 COMM. Y.B. 209, 226-27 (1999) (noting that expectations differ
as between political and social messages, such as anti-smoking campaigns, and
pure advertising).
76 See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETER BRIEFS
AND ORAL ADVOCACY 25-26 (2d ed. 2003) (criticizing briefs that fail to
mention adverse authority and arguments).
77 Indeed, this is the key to cognitive dissonance theory-that it is not
simply that we prefer messages that are two sided to those that are one-sided; it
is that one-sided arguments arouse in us an uncomfortable state that we are
driven to resolve. See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 3.
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actually feel protective of the message.78 In other words, people
may resolve the cognitive dissonance-which is created by the
apparently counter-productive act of disclosing harmful
information-by mentally fighting against the harmful
information. 7 9 The decision-maker may try to figure out why a
biased source is providing her with information that seems bad.
Unlike the scenario described above, the decision-maker does not
feel coerced or manipulated, but she may feel confused. Her
cultural expectations have been contradicted. This cognitive
dissonance reaction is stronger, of course, to the extent that the
person agrees with the message, but the reaction can also arise in
decision-makers who are undecided.so
One possible reaction to this kind of dissonance is that
decision-makers will be driven to develo arguments that dispute
or undermine the harmful information. In this scenario, the
introduction of bad information functions like a vaccine-introduced
virus.82 Our body will fight a vaccine-introduced virus, making us
immune to an attack by that virus. Similarly, our minds can fight
the introduction of harmful information from an unexpected source
by attacking the harmful information with our own
78 Raising flaws or counterarguments in a persuasive message can arouse
feelings of "threat" in the message recipient. This feeling can lead the message
recipient to try to "protect" the message by mentally generating arguments that
undercut the flaw. See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289-90 (noting,
however, that "threat" works largely for messages and arguments with which a
person agrees; it is less effective for arguments with which the audience does
not agree); Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 406-07 (discussing why
inoculation works).
7 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240-41.
80 See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289. See also Michael Pfau et
al., Efficacy of Inoculation Strategies in Promoting Resistance to Political
Attack Messages, 57 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 25 (1990) (inoculation strategy in
political advertisements worked best with strong party identifiers; also worked
with others, but less consistently).
81 See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289; see also PERLOFF, supra
note 2, at 240-41; Pfau et al., supra note 80, at 29.
82 See William J. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some
Contemporary Approaches, in 1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOLOGY 191 (1964) (discussing the original inoculation experiment).
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counterarguments. 83 This process of counterargument has an
interesting vaccination-like effect on our decision-making. It
makes a persuasive message resistant to negative attacks by the
other side. 84
Another related reaction to this dissonance is that the decision-
maker may mentally change the bad information to be less
harmful. Like the person who insists after January 1, 2000 that the
computer disaster will still happen, the decision-maker will
mentally alter "reality" by making the bad information less "bad."
This resolves her dissonance, because if the information is not
really "bad," the advocate's disclosure of it is consistent with the
decision-maker's belief that advocates do not disclose flaws.
Psychologists call this cognitive process "change of meaning."85
Consider an example in which you've paid a considerable sum
of money to see a show. The show turns out to be disappointing.86
Any number of "changes of meaning" can occur here, some overt,
some subtle. You can convince yourself that the show was actually
pretty good. Or, more subtly, you can "add consonant
cognitions"-you can tell yourself that it was worth seeing the
show because one of the actors was very good, or that the set
design was excellent.87 One of the most interesting aspects of this
cognitive process is that the decision-maker is an active participant
in the persuasion-because of the dissonance she feels, she
83 See id; see also STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 298.
84 This has led researchers to liken voluntary disclosure of negative
information to medical immunization because it appears that disclosing negative
information within a persuasive message can actually "inoculate" the message
from future attacks. See McGuire, supra note 82, at 193.
85 Lara Dolnik et al., Stealing Thunder as Courtroom Tactic Revisited:
Processes and Boundaries, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 269 (2003); see also
S.E. Asch, The Doctrine Of Suggestion, Prestige, And Imitation In Social
Psychology, 55 PSYCHOL. REV. 268-69 (1948) (decision-makers changed
meaning of phrase "peaceful revolution" depending on who they thought source
of statement was); Kiva Zunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108
PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 495 (1990) (a decision-maker's motivation can change her
reasoning, her process of deciding, and her evaluation of evidence).
86 This example is adapted from PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240.
87 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240.
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participates in persuading herself88
In one key study of "change of meaning" in the legal context,
message recipients were surveyed to determine their reactions to a
trial strategy that voluntarily disclosed bad information, and one
that waited for the other side to disclose.89 In the study, subjects
read a trial transcript of a criminal trial involving a car accident in
which one driver died.90 The other driver escaped with only minor
injuries. The driver with minor injuries is charged with vehicular
homicide. The prosecution's theory is that the defendant was
driving recklessly. The defendant's theory is that the other driver
died due to the negligence of the ambulance crew that responded to
the accident. Researchers tested several different pieces of bad
information: evidence that the defendant had been drinking before
the accident, evidence that the defendant was speeding, and
forensic evidence that the defendant had veered into the other
lane.91
Across all of these variables of bad information, subjects who
heard the defendant voluntarily disclose the bad information
consistently discounted it. They quite literally remembered it as
being weaker and less damaging when compared with the trial in
which the prosecution disclosed the flaw. 92 In other words, the
subjects' minds actually changed the meaning of the bad
information to be less harmful. This is an excellent example of Dr.
Perloffs observation about how the persuasive process works:
"[p]eople persuade themselves ... [the advocates] provide the
arguments. They set up the bait .... We make the change." 93 in
the vehicular homicide trial, the advocate simply put out the "bait"
by volunteering harmful information and creating the
uncomfortable feeling of dissonance. The mock jurors resolved the
8 Id. at 13-14 ("One of the great myths of persuasion is that persuaders
convince us to do things we really don't want to do . .. . This overlooks an
important point: People persuade themselves . . . [advocates] provide the
arguments. They set up the bait. [But] we make the change, or refuse to yield.").
89 Lara Dolnik et al., supra note 85, at 277.
9o Id. at 271, 277.
9' Id. at 277.
92 Id. at 283.
9 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 13-14.
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dissonance by convincing themselves that the evidence was not
that harmful.94
Change of meaning is largely an unconscious mental process.
In the vehicular homicide case, it is unlikely that the mock jurors
realized they were feeling or resolving dissonance. They may not
even have remembered feeling uncomfortable about the
disclosure-they simply remembered the harmful evidence as not
so harmful. 95 And once decision-makers, on their own, come to
that belief about the evidence, it becomes their own belief. And
once embraced, viewpoints are powerful and difficult to alter.
There are many lessons that can be drawn from these studies.
As an initial matter, there certainly seems to be an explicit
advantage to disclosing negative information voluntarily-and
first. From a broader perspective, another lesson is that there are
times when it is advantageous to put forth a less-than-perfect
persuasive message-a more balanced approach that acknowledges
weakness. The studies show conclusively that there is real power-
persuasive power-in acknowledging some vulnerability in your
argument.
94 This is, of course, not the only possible response. The key to the
dissonance (and its resolution) is the expectation of the audience that advocates
will put forth only positive support for their cases. If the jury does not have this
expectation, the result might be different. If, for example, people assume that the
lawyer brought up a flaw because he is incompetent, they might have a different
reaction.
9 There is one key problem with extrapolating too widely from this study.
In this study, once the defendant voluntarily disclosed the harmful evidence, that
was the last the jury heard about it. The prosecution did not harp on the harmful
evidence, or try to reframe it, either in cross-examination or in closing. It is an
open question whether jurors would change meaning if, as in an actual litigation,
one side discloses a flaw and the other side has a field day with it on cross-
examination. That more realistic scenario is the subject of a current field study.
See Deirdre Bowen & Kathryn Stanchi, Thunder Road: Does the Timing of
Disclosure of Bad Evidence Really Matter in Civil Trials? (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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III. AVOIDING DISSONANCE: EASING THE READER INTO
CONTROVERSIAL OR DISPUTED PREMISES
In addition to the way advocates treat flaws in their arguments,
another key aspect of adopting a reasonable tone, and avoiding
dissonance, is by approaching positive arguments in a subtle way.
Arguments supporting an advocate's position can arouse
dissonance when they are over-argued or uncompromising. This is
particularly dangerous for premises that are controversial, hotly
disputed, or that have limited or no supporting authority. These
more problematic premises are common for legal advocates to
encounter. What legal advocates need to know is that when they
find themselves needing to argue a controversial or hotly disputed
premise, they are confronting a situation likely to arouse cognitive
dissonance in their decision-maker.
Controversial premises arouse dissonance because all decision-
makers want to act in a way that is consistent with their prior
decisions, self-images, and egos.96 Thus, the more controversial or
unsupported an argument is, the more dissonance it is likely to
arouse. Conversely, an argument that has a lot of support or seems
reasonable feels good to us in part because it avoids the discomfort
of dissonance and arouses the positive feelings of consistency.
Indeed, researchers remain uncertain about whether we change
our beliefs to sustain consistency (as with our rationalizations
about the bad, expensive show) or whether we simply observe our
own behaviors and draw conclusions from that (i.e. the show must
have been good, because I stayed until the end and I am not the
kind of person who wastes money on bad shows). Whichever is the
true source of our behavior-belief connection, the bottom line is
that if an advocate presents an argument that allows the decision-
maker to feel as though he is behaving consistently with his beliefs
and his prior decisions, the argument is more likely to be
persuasive. On the other hand, an argument that somewhat
abruptly asks the reader to embrace something entirely new and
strange will be uncomfortable for the reader.97
96 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 248-49.
97 We would expect judges to place a particularly high value on
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The difficulty here, of course, is that most advocates do not
know the beliefs of the decision-makers in front of whom they
argue. Would that we did! We may have some clues if we are
appearing before a judge we know or who has previously decided
cases similar to ours. But with jurors, we have no idea, and with
many judges, we will have no trail that gives us a clear picture of
the judge's beliefs on our issue.
But even if an advocate does not know the decision-maker's
beliefs, the advocate can present an argument that makes the
decision-maker experience the good feeling of consistency and
avoid the bad feeling of dissonance. Science suggests that if we
organize our arguments so that our ultimate argument-the goal
for which we are striving-appears to be the natural consequence
of a series of arguments with which the decision-maker will agree,
we can minimize the bad feeling of dissonance associated with a
controversial premise and maximize that good feeling of
consistency.9 8
In other words, the advocate should slowly and methodically
lead up to a controversial premise with "baby step" arguments with
which the decision-maker is likely to agree. The key is to carefully
choose the baby-step arguments that lead up to the more difficult
premise. This approach mimics how people reason. It creates a set
of expectations in the decision-maker such that a decision
consistent with the argument feels good, and a decision contrary to
the ultimate premise would trigger cognitive dissonance.
In one study, for example, scientists tried to get homeowners in
a development to post on their lawns a large sign about safe
driving.99 When, as a first step, scientists asked people to put up
the large sign, most people declined. But the scientists were able to
consistency, given the value of consistency in American jurisprudence, which is
based on stare decisis.
98 See studies cited infra notes 101-06.
99 See Jonathon J. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance without
Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
195, 199 (1966). See also Jerry M. Burger & David F. Caldwell, The Effects of
Monetary Incentives and Labeling on the Foot-in-the-Door Effect: Evidence for
a Self-Perception Process, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 235 (2003)
(conducting similar experiment with a homelessness petition).
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change this high rejection rate by doing one thing: they first asked
the homeowners to do something easy-to sign a petition to "Keep
California Beautiful." 00 Most of the homeowners agreed to sign
the petition. And once the homeowners agreed to sign the petition,
they were much more likely to agree to post the large sign.101 In
other words, the homeowners were much more likely to agree to
the big request (one that they ordinarily would have rejected) if
they first agreed to an easier request.102
This phenomenon is sometimes called the "foot-in-the-door"
strategy. 0 3 There is some disagreement about why it works. Some
scientists believe that it works because people look at prior
behavior to ascertain their values and beliefs; others believe it
works because of cognitive dissonance.' 04 The bottom line is that
our decision-making grows out of our prior behavior and decisions.
When we are asked to make a decision, our brains go through a
fast process in which we try to determine whether we have made a
similar decision previously and what we decided. We tend to treat
100 Freedman & Fraser, supra note 99, at 199-201.
1o' Id. at 200-01.
102 Id. at 201-02.
103 Id. at 199-202. For a general discussion of foot in the door technique as
it relates to legal persuasion, see Kathryn Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion:
An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 418-20 [hereinafter
Stanchi, Science ofPersuasion].
'0 Not all psychologists agree that this process works because of cognitive
dissonance. As Richard Perloff notes, some psychologists do not agree that
people neurotically change their beliefs to conform to their behavior. PERLOFF,
supra note 2, at 249. Rather, some believe that people infer or come to their
beliefs simply by astutely observing their past decisions and behavior (I eat a lot
of pasta and vegetables, so I must be a vegetarian). See DARYL J. BEM, BELIEFS,
ATTITUDES, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 50 (1970). The difference is a subtle one-
between noticing behavior and concluding that current decisions must be right
because they are consistent with that behavior versus running from an
inconsistent decision by changing a belief or behavior. For the purposes of
applying the concept to legal advocacy, the subtle distinction is perhaps less
relevant, but nevertheless should be noted. Contra COGNITIVE DISSONANCE:
PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon-
Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the
Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological
Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (1994).
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prior decisions as a kind of precedent and make current decisions
that are consistent with past ones.
We will almost always seek to make a current decision that is
consistent with our self-image, which itself is created by our past
decisions. A high magnitude of cognitive dissonance is likely to
result if we make a decision that is inconsistent with our prior
decisions (and the image of ourselves that we drew from those
prior decisions).
For legal advocates, the key is that arguments can be structured
so that the premise we want the decision-maker to adopt is the one
that feels the best-avoids cognitive dissonance and feeds the
decision-maker's desire for consistency. Legal advocates can do
this by breaking down the controversial premise into component
premises that are easier to agree to-the law version of the "Keep
California Beautiful" petition.
By breaking down a controversial premise into components
with which the decision-maker is likely to agree, the advocate can
build and influence the decision-maker's relevant cache of prior
decisions. And, because the premises presented by the advocate are
the most recent, they are the ones at the forefront when the
decision-maker starts that lightning fast search of prior decisions to
gauge, and maintain, consistency. The component arguments or
premises should have two qualities: they must be easy for the
decision-maker to accept, and they must be linked to the ultimate
controversial premise. The more attractive the component
premises, and the more closely linked to the ultimate premise, the
harder it will be for the decision-maker to reject the ultimate
premise.s0 5
A useful metaphor for this decision-making process is trying to
convince a person to jump off the high dive. 10 6 With the "foot-in-
the-door" strategy, the diver is cajoled to step up to the first step,
then the second, then the third, and so on, until at some point it
becomes easier and more comfortable psychologically to dive than
to walk down all those steps. Diving is consistent with having
105 See generally Stanchi, Science ofPersuasion, supra note 103.
106 This metaphor comes from G. RAY FUNKHOUSER, THE POWER OF
PERSUASION: A GUIDE TO MOVING AHEAD IN BuSINESS AND LIFE 114 (1986).
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agreed to step up all those steps; walking down is an
acknowledgement that the diver was wrong to agree to take the
early steps. Because walking down will create cognitive
dissonance, our brains will take great steps to avoid that feeling.
That means that the more steps we take toward the high dive, the
more likely it is that we will dive.
In written briefs, "foot-in-the-door" can be used to organize
arguments in a number of ways to make controversial arguments
less dissonant. First, it can be used on a macro level to structure
arguments in headings or to decide the order of paragraphs within
a heading. Second, on a micro level, it can be used to organize
sentences within paragraphs.
Headings in a brief are a good macro-organizational tool to
prime acquiescence and reduce dissonance when the reader is
asked to agree with the disputed, controversial premise. Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep 't of Health'0 7 presents an excellent example of this
tactic. Cruzan involved a highly controversial premise: whether the
parents of a woman in a persistent vegetative state should be
permitted to discontinue life-saving medical treatment and,
essentially, cause their daughter to die. 0 8 This premise is both
legally controversial and emotionally difficult. It is likely to cause
all kinds of cognitive dissonance.
The petitioners, the Cruzans, lost in the Missouri Supreme
Court and appealed to the United States Supreme Court.109 Here is
an abridged version of the table of contents from the Petitioner's
brief:
I. THE MAJORITY BELOW ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT INCOMPETENT PERSONS
LOSE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
WITHDRAWAL OF UNWANTED MEDICAL
TREATMENT, AND THAT THE STATE,
RATHER THAN THAT PERSON'S FAMILY
SHOULD MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT
107 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
'os id. at 266-69.




A. All Persons Have A Fundamental Liberty Interest
To Stop Unwarranted Bodily Intrusions By The
State
B. Incompetent Persons Retain Constitutional Rights
Even Though They Cannot Now Voice Their
Choices
C. The Concept Of Family Decision-making Is
Deeply Rooted In The Traditions Of This Country
D. Missouri's General Interest In Prolonging Life Is
Not Sufficient To Override Nancy Cruzan's
Constitutional Rights To Withdrawal Of Unwanted
Medical Treatment" 0
Headings A, B, and C are the "foot-in-the-door" premises.
They are axiomatic. Who would disagree that people have a right
to avoid "bodily invasion" by the state? 11 That incompetent
people retain constitutional rights? That "family decision-making"
is deeply embedded in our culture? Notice that cognitive
dissonance is at work in the crafting of the component premises.
The component premises are phrased in such a way that
disagreement with them will arouse dissonance. The self-concept
of most people, perhaps particularly decision-makers, requires that
we agree with premises that seem eminently fair, just, and non-
discriminatory-especially to particularly vulnerable people. 112
"0 Brief for Petitioners at 11-111, Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (No. 88-1503), 1989 WL 1115261.
" 1 This heading is particularly brilliant in its framing and in the vividness
of its imagery. A case that could easily be framed as a woman's parents trying to
take her life is reframed into a case about state "invasion" of the woman's bodily
integrity.
112 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 248 (citing Elliot Aronson, Dissonance
Theory: Progress and Problems, in THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY 5, 24
(Robert P. Abelson et al. eds., 1968)); Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-
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Once the reader gets to Heading D, cognitive dissonance again
plays a role. The advocate has now convinced the decision-maker
that A, B, and C are true and part of the decision-maker's strongly
held beliefs. The advocate has also linked A, B, and C to D.
Therefore, if the decision-maker disagrees with D, dissonance is
likely to arise. The decision-maker can avoid this dissonance by
accepting premise D. The path to the comfortable feeling of
consistency and consonance is diving off the metaphorical high
dive: accept the controversial premise that has been linked to a
bedrock of prior agreed-to decisions.
The organization of sentences within a thesis paragraph
presents a good example of foot-in-the-door used on a micro-
organizational level. In well-written briefs, you will often see a
paragraph begin with a less controversial premise, or even a series
of less controversial premises. The ultimate premise, the one on
which the disagreement between the parties truly is based, will
follow those less controversial premises. Consider the Petitioner's
brief in Atkins v. Virginia.113 In Atkins, the petitioner argued that
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded individuals
violated the Eighth Amendment.11 4 This is another premise likely
to cause severe dissonance. Both mental retardation 5 and the
death penalty are difficult, uncomfortable issues for many people
to address. Adding to the problematic nature of the argument, a
recent Supreme Court decision, Penry v. Lynaugh,l 6 had rejected
the idea that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the
death sentence for the mentally retarded.'"7 So, there was direct,
Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self, in 21 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261, 270 (1988).
113 Brief for Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-
8452), 2001 WL 1663817.
114 Id. at 22-40. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.").
115 Indeed, using the term "mental retardation" in the brief was an
interesting, and I believe, strategic choice by Atkins' counsel. It avoided
euphemisms like "developmentally disabled" and confronted head on our likely
discomfort with the word "retardation" and "retarded."
116 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).




Counsel for Atkins began the brief, in heading A, by
confronting the controversial premise that the mentally retarded
categorically do not have the same level of personal culpability as
a person of normal intellect who chooses to commit a crime.
This was a premise explicitly rejected by Penry just thirteen years
before.119 But counsel does not jar the reader by starting the
paragraph with this premise. Rather, the thesis paragraph after
heading B eases the reader into the controversial premise. These
sentences follow the heading in B (the numbers and parenthetical
commentary are mine):
1. This Court has repeatedly emphasized the
central importance of personal culpability in
capital sentencing. (easily accepted, this is
Supreme Court law)
2. The death penalty "takes as its predicate the
existence of a fully rational, choosing
agent." (easily accepted)
3. This predicate is grounded in the fundamental
principle that "the more purposeful is the
criminal conduct. . . the more seriously it ought
to be punished." (easily accepted)
4. As a result, the death penalty is an appropriate
punishment for those who deliberate or act with
calculus. (easily accepted, and adds a note of
reasonableness to the argument because it
makes the argument two-sided)
5. But it is a disproportionate penalty for those
with "an immature, undeveloped ability to
assertion that "all mentally retarded people . . . by virtue of their mental
retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their
personal responsibility-inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty."
Id. at 338. Admittedly, Penry was decided by a divided court and represented
something of a compromise on the execution of the mentally retarded, but it was
nevertheless bad precedent for Atkins.
18 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 22.
119 Penry, 492 U.S. at 338.
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reason," or those without the capacity to make a
fully reasoned choice. (disputed premise of
case)120
With this chain, the writer has set up the decision-maker to
accept the last and controversial premise by leading up to it with a
series of reasonable, easily accepted premises. If you agree with
premises 1 through 4, then premise 5 follows naturally. Notice how
the chain makes the tone appear reasonable, moderate, and almost
objective. The reader hears nothing controversial until that last
premise, and by the time she gets there, that last premise seems
hardly controversial. What the writer has done here is structure her
argument to reduce the cognitive dissonance likely to be aroused
by premise 5, by carefully leading the reader on a reasoning path
that leads inexorably to its acceptance.
Many lawyers wonder how this psychological tactic works in
conjunction with headings. After all, the chain from the Atkins
brief directly followed headings that asserted the controversial
premises clearly and strongly. The heading gave the reader ample
notice of the disputed premise and ample notice that she was going
to be asked to jump off the high dive, which means that dissonance
might have been aroused as soon as the decision-maker read the
heading. 12 1 The same issue is apparent in the Cruzan headings,
which start with a major heading (Roman I) that sets out the
controversial premise.122
120 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 26-27 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
121 The chain from Atkins followed after these two headings, directly after
A:
I. A PROCEDURE THAT PERMITS THE DEATH
PENALTY TO BE INFLICTED ON DEFENDANTS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION DESPITE THEIR DIMINISHED
PERSONAL CULPABILITY VIOLATES THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
A. Mental retardation impairs understanding functioning in
ways that substantially reduce personal culpability.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 22.
122 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. See also Brief for
Petitioners, supra note I10, at II-III.
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This is a legitimate question. After all, the scientists in the
"foot-in-the-door" experiments did not talk to homeowners about
the large lawn sign before asking them about the petition.123
Admittedly, there are many differences between asking
homeowners about a lawn sign and trying to persuade a judge. But
if we look at the underlying reasons why "foot-in-the-door" works,
the differences become less important. Remember that the key to
the "foot-in-the-door" reaction is the need for prior decisions, a
kind of cache of precedent. This cache of prior decisions helps the
decision-maker avoid dissonance (or helps decision-makers
determine their belief systems, so that they can act consistently).
The "foot-in-the-door" tactic does not ensure that advocates
can entirely avoid decision-makers' dissonance. To be sure, when
the decision-maker sees the "high dive" (the controversial
premise), she will likely experience discomfort. But the "foot-in-
the-door" strategy helps advocates alleviate or assuage decision-
makers' dissonance. And, it helps resolve the dissonance in a
particular direction that is favorable to the advocate.
While it is true that the mere assertion of the controversial
premise itself causes psychological discomfort and dissonance, the
critical point of decision-making is usually not at the heading
stage-in legal writing, the heading is a kind of "herald" of the
argument to come. The heading shows the decision-maker the high
dive, but the decision-maker has not yet been asked to dive. The
social norms of the persuasive situation require that the decision-
maker read the arguments that follow the heading before making a
decision; at the point of the heading, the decision-maker arguably
still has (or should have) an open mind. So, the critical point for
the advocate comes later, when the decision-maker has read the
arguments and is more likely to ponder whether to agree or not
agree with the controversial premise. At that point, the decision-
maker can either feel stronger dissonance, or she can feel the
comfort of having made a decision that seems to be entirely
consistent with her prior experiences and decisions. Organizing a
legal argument by easing the reader into the premise can make the
reader feel those good feelings of consistency and avoid
123 Freedman & Fraser, supra note 99, at 200.
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uncomfortable feelings of dissonance.
Finally, what about juries? The special relationship advocates
have with judges might suggest that easing into controversy is a
good idea in that particular relationship. After all, judges are
skeptical; they hear arguments all the time and are going to be
especially sensitive to over-arguing and obvious persuasion and
manipulation. This would make brief-writing the paradigmatic
occasion for an argument style that eases into controversy, rather
than one that stridently over-argues. However, the relationship
between advocates and juries can be seen as quite different, and
juries may have very different views about advocacy than judges.
But lawyers also use the "foot-in-the-door" tactic to persuade
juries to follow a controversial premise. Gerry Spence has
described a tactic that he uses in voir dire to diffuse a common and
strongly held prejudice that juries have against plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' lawyers. 124 To diffuse the belief that plaintiffs are just
trying to make money off the death of a loved one or their own
injuries, and that plaintiffs' lawyers are predators who chase
ambulances, Spence constructs a series of premises that lead up to
a controversial one. This tactic works because of "foot-in-the-
door" principles. Here is the example:
Without me, Shirley White (my client) will have to
face this judge and this jury alone with no one to
speak for her ... . Without me, there will be no one
to stop Mr. Ketchum [the defendant's lawyer] from
dumping improper evidence into the case and there
will be no one to argue the law on her behalf to his
honor. And without me she will have to argue her
case by herself against the likes of Mr. Ketchum,
who is a powerful lawyer with power people behind
him. So, Mr. Black [juror], is it all right with you if
Shirley has chosen me to fight for her rights? 2 5
This relatively simple emotional appeal can be deconstructed to
reveal a series of cleverly linked arguments. What follows is my
124 See GERRY SPENCE, WIN YOUR CASE: How TO PRESENT, PERSUADE
AND PREvAIL-EVERY PLACE, EVERY TIME 119-20 (reprt ed. 2006).
125 Id. at 120. There are also a number of other similar strategies outlined in
the chapter. See id at 112-27.
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paraphrase of Spence's tactic as a way of exposing the argument
chain within the emotional appeal:
1. Shirley White will face this judge and jury alone
unless I am here. (Poor Shirley White!)
2. If she is alone, no one can stop the other side
from cheating. (Terrible! Notice also that this
premise cleverly embeds the idea that the other
side would try to cheat if they could.)
3. Without a lawyer, she'll have to face powerful
people with no one on her side. (How unfair!)
4. So, isn't it ok that I am here to fight for Shirley
White?
The first three premises are akin to the requests of the scientists
who asked homeowners to sign a petition before asking them to
display a large lawn sign. Once homeowners signed that petition,
agreement to the lawn sign on the property was much more easily
accomplished. The same process is at work here. Once a juror
agrees to 1, 2, and 3-and 1, 2, and 3 are cleverly designed so that
the juror will almost certainly do SO126-she will say yes to
premise 4, or else she will be sanctioning unfairness and even
cheating! The juror's own self-image as a fair, caring person will
force her to accept premise 4, at the risk of a powerful surge of
cognitive dissonance.' 27
And, perhaps most cleverly, once the juror says yes to premise
4, Spence can be fairly certain he can safely allow the juror to
serve on his case without bias against the plaintiff, perhaps even
126 Dissonance is also at work in the agreement to premises 1, 2, and 3. See
Tedeschi Schlenker & Bonoma, Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or
Public Spectacle?, 26 AMER. PSYCHOL. 685, 690-91 (1971) (dissonance is
aroused by a desire not to look bad in front of others).
127 This type of persuasion is called "induced compliance." PERLOFF, supra
note 2 at 244-45, 253 (when an individual is induced to publicly espouse a
position contrary to her private beliefs, and she cannot rationalize the public
statement away, she will experience dissonance). See also Leon Festinger &
James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 209-10 (1959) (experimentally supporting
theory that "if a person is induced to do or say something which is contrary to
his private opinion, there will be a tendency for him to change his opinion so as
to bring it into correspondence with what he has done or said").
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bias in Spence's favor. Spence has changed the cache of
information that jurors will consult if they find themselves irritated
by Spence's tactics at trial, or if the bias against personal injury
lawyers rears its head again. The jurors' cache of personal
"precedent" now includes a prior agreement to let Spence speak on
behalf of Ms. White. Spence has wedged his "foot-in-the-door"--
he has gotten the juror to agree to something (in front of others),
and the juror's psychological need for consistency (and to avoid
cognitive dissonance) will mean that the juror is likely to put aside
his biases about plaintiffs' lawyers. Indeed, the juror may even
overcorrect in Spence's client's favor because the juror has
recently, and publicly, announced that it was "all right" for Ms.
White to have Spence as her lawyer. The momentum will be
strongly in favor of finding for Spence's client because of the
dissonance that will result from the worry that a finding against
Spence's client would be "proof' that the juror is not, in fact, a fair
person. Most human beings would feel embarrassed and
uncomfortable in the face of such "proof' (the cognitive
dissonance will be strong) and will do what they can to avoid that
feeling.
This example from Gerry Spence might seem to be a peculiar
one. In some ways, particularly in its emotional manipulation, it is
pretty heavy-handed. Spence is not known for his "light touch" in
the courtroom-and indeed, I quoted him above as an example of a
lawyer who sees litigation as war. 128 But this gets to the heart of
my point: whether we see litigation as a battle or not, it is how we
do battle that matters. Spence does not go into the jury room and
say, "You probably don't feel good about plaintiffs' lawyers-you
think they are litigious and money grubbing. But that's wrong. I'm
not money grubbing-I'm doing this for good reasons. I'm a good
guy, on the side of the angels! I'm the guy on the white horse. I'm
here to help Ms. White. Mr. Ketchum is a bad man who probably
will try to cheat, and I'm the good guy who can stop him. Don't
you agree that I'm the good guy here?" Not only would that not
likely be allowed at voir dire, but it also would not be effective.
Our mental processes do not work that way. When an advocate
128 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tries to push people too hard in a particular direction, people
usually respond negatively. Spence's tactic does the same work,
but more subtly. Spence is not yelling at jurors to jump off the high
dive. Instead he eases them up each rung until they have actually
persuaded themselves that they should dive.
In answering the question of the better route to persuasion,
what cognitive dissonance and "foot-in-the-door" studies tell us is
that a technique that eases the reader step by step to the
controversial premise will ease, or even dispel, dissonance. A
rhetorical strategy that takes "baby steps" closely mimics an
objective decision-maker's reasoning process. It is subtle and
gradual; it allows decision-makers to participate in persuading
themselves. The advocate is less conspicuous and that makes
decision-makers feel more autonomous. Feelings of autonomy
avoid reactance. The advocate becomes a guide to be followed, not
an aggressor to be fought.
CONCLUSION
Overt aggression can be tempting and satisfying for the
advocate and her client-when you feel deeply the rightness of
your cause, it is hard to understand how a decision-maker could
fail to see things your way. It is very easy to think, "If I just push
harder, more unrelentingly, maybe I can get the decision-maker to
embrace my position." But this ignores a fundamental truism about
human nature-more often than not, pushing harder does not make
the other person see our viewpoint, it makes the other person push
back against it.
This Article addresses two advocacy scenarios: (1) dealing
with adverse information or arguments, and (2) introducing a
controversial premise. At first glance, these two scenarios may
appear to have little in common. But their commonality lies in the
opportunities they present for the advocate to adopt a reasonable
tone or a more aggressive one. An advocate can aggressively push
a "too-perfect" one-sided argument, and can introduce a
controversial premise by hammering it at the first opportunity. But
what cognitive dissonance tells us is that in these two scenarios,
the better approach may be for the advocate to acknowledge
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weakness and present arguments in a way that seems more
measured and objective.
Part of the art of advocacy is keeping one's eye on the goal-
and the goal is, ultimately, to convince the decision-maker of our
position, not to pound the decision-maker on the head (as
satisfying as that sometimes might be). And in most contexts,
convincing others is a task that needs patience and forbearance:
being a boxer but looking like a teacher. In other words, it requires
advocates to walk the fine line of showing our zeal and our deep
belief in our clients without looking like zealots. This means that
sometimes, a tone of reasonableness and temperance is the surest
route to the ultimate goal of convincing the decision-maker.
